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ENFORCING PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
EXTENDING PROPERTY RIGHTS THEORY TO 
CONGESTIBLE AND ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS 
David W. Barnes· 
INTRODUCTION 
The property rights literature has focused the attention of scholars 
on the social, economic, and legal implications of alternative systems 
of ownership, management, and control of property. The usual top-
ics explored are the implications of alternative systems for produc-
tion by firms, for allocation of scarce resources in society, and for the 
efficient coordination of production and allocation decisions. l The 
focus of property rights theory has been on "the interconnectedness 
of ownership rights, incentives, and economic behavior."2 While this 
statement of the purview of property rights theory sounds as though 
it would be all encompassing, the literature has directed its attention 
to a small set of alternative specifications of property rights. Discus-
sions of property rights and resource allocation have largely focused 
on what has been referred to as the "(c)ompetition for and transfera-
bility of the ownership right in the marketplace."s 
The recognition of "externalities" associated with private owner-
ship, such as the polluting by-products of a private production proc-
• Assistant Professor of Law and Economics, Syracuse University College of Law and Max-
well School of Citizenship and Public Affairs; A.B. Dartmouth College; J.D. University of 
Pennsylvania; Ph.D. Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University; Member 
Pennsylvania Bar. 
1. See generally Furubotn & Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of 
Recent Literature, 10 J. OF ECON. LIT. 1137-62 (1972). 
2. Id. at 1137. 
3. Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J. 
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ess, has broadened the usual scope of inquiry beyond the private ver-
sus common ownership dichotomy. This broader view extends the in-
quiry of property rights theory into the realm of welfare theory in 
which the overall social implications of private choices are examined. 
An examination of the externalities associated with private choices 
in the context of their overall social effects suggests the need for 
some form of regulation of private choices. Whenever private 
choices are limited by government regulation or by societal norms, 
the organization and content of those constraining institutions will 
affect both private choices and the welfare of society. Thus, property 
rights may be viewed through the context of institutional structures 
which embody both rights and their related sanctions. An institution-
al structure is the entire body of laws, regulations, ordinances, and 
norms that constrains private choice with respect to the use of a par-
ticular resource. These structures may range from a formal system 
of regulation, such as that embodied in the Clean Air Act,4 to an ac-
cumulated and mutually recognized body of rules of social behavior, 
such as the common law of real property. From an institutional 
structure comes a set of property rights which specify in varying 
degrees of particularity those rules of behavior with respect to a re-
source that individuals are expected to follow. In effect, it is the 
change in the assignment of property rights through an institutional 
structure which results in "regulation." In a mixed private-property-
with-governmental-regulation society such as ours, where the rights 
incident to the production and possession of property are highly 
regulated, the implications of the choice of institutional structures 
and property rights systems are particularly important. This article 
presents and applies a framework for analyzing institutional struc-
tures and societal responses to changes in property rights systems. 
The model presented focuses specifically on regulatory agencies. It 
does not emphasize the behavior of regulators, although an 
understanding of their motivations and incentives is crucial to a com-
plete description of institutional structure.5 The aim is rather to use 
the private/common ownership dichotomy as a foundation upon 
OF LAw & ECON., 49,64-70 (1970). See also Demsetz, Toward a Theory ofPraperty Rights, 57 
AM. ECON. REV., 347-73 (1967); infra note 25. 
4. 42 U.S.C. SS 7401-7642 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
5. See G. TuLLOCK, THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY (1965); W. A. NISKANEN, JR., 
BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GoVERNMENT (1971). 
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which to build a more comprehensive analysis of property rights. 6 
Once erected, the property rights model is used to explore the in-
stitutional milieu in which the regulators and the regulated interact. 
The institutional framework is the "given" with respect to which 
persons interacting within the society adjust. This model presents a 
systematic way of describing the institutional ballpark within which 
the game of using resources is played. In so doing, it offers a slightly 
different perspective on a number of variables traditionally con-
sidered relevant to policy analysis. 
The model developed here addresses the issue of the costs of en-
forcing government regulations affecting resource use, particularly 
clean air laws. Previous studies have separately considered the 
behavior of enforcers7 and of regulated firms8 as well as general con-
siderations relevant to the choice of enforcement tools.9 This article 
provides a methodology for combining these contributions and 
analyzing in a comparative statics framework1o the changes in the 
level of enforcement costs resulting from a change in property rights 
regulating resource use. 
Section II expands the traditional notion of property rights by in-
corporating the theory of public goods. In Section II.A., public goods 
theory is used to describe how types of goods or resources vary from 
one another in terms of how users of resources and producers and 
consumers of goods derive benefits from.!heir production or 
consumption. By understanding how goods are different from one 
6 See, Barnes, Back Door Cost·Benefit Analysis Under a Safety·First Clean Air Act, NAT. 
RES. J. (1983) (forthcoming) (which uses this model to examine the implications of regulators' 
motivations and behavior). 
7. See, e.g., Posner, The Behavior of Administrative Agencies, 1 J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 305-47 
(1972). 
8. See, e.g., Downing & Watson, The Economics of Enforcing Air Pollution Controls, 1 J. OF 
ENVT'L ECON. & MGT 219-36 (1974). 
9. See, e.g., Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J. OF LAW & 
ECON. 11-26 (1964); Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. OF POL. 
ECON. 169-217 (1968). 
10. A comparative statics approach is one in which a model is used to describe what the 
system being examined looks like before and after changes in factors influencing that system 
occur. It does not explain the dynamics of how the change occcurs but rather compares the 
before and after status of the system. The difference between a comparative statics approach 
and a dynamic approach in this article is the same as the difference between examining 
whether more enforcement officials must be used to enforce a change in the Clean Air Act and 
examining the process by which new enforcers are employed, trained, and sent out into the 
field. 
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another, we will appreciate how legal rules allocating rights to those 
goods may vary systematically. One relevant characteristic of goods 
discussed is the ease or difficulty of protecting one's right to be re-
warded by society for producing units of a good or one's right to con-
sume units of a good once acquired. Section II.B. describes how the 
manner in which legal rules specify property rights affects the cost 
of enforcing rights to goods and resources. Throughout Section II. 
rights to the resource "clean air" are compared to rights to re-
sources with different public goods and enforcement characteristics. 
Section III completes the property rights enforcement model by 
adding a dollar measure of the costs of enforcement and deriving a 
relationship which describes for any fully specified property rights· 
system the cost of enforcing those rights. The model allows for com-
parison of a variety of alternative enforcement technologies as well 
as a calculation of the optimal level of enforcement activity, that is, 
the level of costs of enforcement activity which is justified by the 
associated benefits. 
Section IV uses the property rights model to describe the 
characteristics that are most relevant to the enforcement of a par-
ticular regulatory structure, the Clean Air Act. Mter describing the 
Clean Air Act in property rights terms, the property rights model is 
used to examine the enforcement cost implications of these changes 
in rules governing resource use which are implicit in amendments to 
the Clean Air Act. Amendments embodied in P .L. 95-95, the Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1977,11 and in H.R. 5252,12 a leading bill to 
amend the Clean Air Act currently before the 97th Congress, are 
considered as examples. The model highlights the variety of tech-
nical and quantitative measures necessary to appreciate the interre-
lationship between regulatory structure and enforcement costs and 
necessary to estimate the enforcement cost implications of changing 
a set of property rights. 
II. EXPANDING THE NOTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
A system of property rights related to a particular resource de-
scribes rules of behavior with respect to that resource. Economic 
agents, those consuming or producing the resource, must either fol-
low these rules or ignore them at the risk of paying associated penal-
11. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. SS 7401-7642 (Supp. III 
1979». 
12. H.R. 5252, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 
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ties. When the resource is one regulated by an administrative agen-
cy, the goals and purposes of the regulation are often set forth in 
statutes establishing the institutional structure. Rules for behavior 
of both the agency and regulated economic agents as well as guide-
lines for enforcing the rules are also set forth in various statutes or 
regulations. The laws establishing the institutional structure, includ-
ing rules for behavior and enforcement, comprise a set of property 
rights relating to a particular resource. For instance, the property 
rights system with respect to clean air is comprised of the Clean Air 
Act of 1970 as amended,18 supplemented by the regulations promul-
gated by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EP A); the decisions of administrative and judicial bodies; the im-
plementation plans of the various states; and the rules emanating 
from air quality control region guidelines and municipal ordinances. 
With respect to any resource that is available only in limited quan-
tities, property rights will specify norms of behavior for two types of 
economic agents, pure consumers and pure producers of that re-
source. The rights assigned to consumers and producers are analo-
gous in property law terms to the rights to usus and usus fructus 
respectively. Usus is the right of the beneficiary (the economic agent 
assigned the right) to the bare use of real or personal property 
without enjoying its income or profit. Thus, while usus does not im-
ply the right to reap rewards from society from the use of a resource, 
it does imply the right of a consumer to diminish the quantity of the 
resource available to other consumers. The right to "rewards from 
society" is embodied in the ususfructus which is conceived of as the 
right to the income or profit resulting from the production and/or 
transfer of resources.1' Rewards or profits are associated with in-
creasing the supply of a given resource. 
It is important to note that firms as well as individuals may be pure 
consumers (quantity decreasers) with respect to some resources and 
pure producers (quantity increasers) with respect to others. For that 
13. 42 U.S.C. SS 7401-7642 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
14. The modified notion of U8U8 .fructus here is not to be confused with the legal concept of 
usufruct - the right to use and enjoy the fruits or profits of an estate or thing belonging to 
another. U8U8.fructus here implies not onlyajusjruendi, the right to take and enjoy the fruits 
and avails of the productive mechanism, but also a jus disponendi, power to transfer owner-
ship in whole or in part of a good (such as the resource produced). The ownership of the good 
produced is presumed to reside at least initially in the party to whom the U8U8.fructus is as-
signed. For more on these distinctions see Roscoe Pound, The Changing Role of Pr(fJJ61'ty in 
American Jurisprudence, CONFERENCE ON THE USE AND DISPOSITION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY, 
31-46. Conference Series No. 12 (1953). 
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matter, an economic agent may be a consumer and producer with 
respect to the same resource. An electric utility consumes (decreases 
the available quantity of) electricity in the process of producing (in-
creasing the quantity of) electric power. In the property rights model 
the focus in these definitions is on the role rather than the identity of 
a particular economic agent. Thus, the electric utility, for example, 
must be regarded as a consumer for some purposes and as a pro-
ducer for others. 
A. Property Rights and Consumption Characteristics of Resources 
1. Consumption Characteristics of Congestible Public Goods 
Public goods theory describes characteristics of the process of con-
suming resources and the process of reaping rewards from produc-
tive activity. The characteristic of joint ness in consumption is readily 
applicable to real world situations in its "congestible public goods" 
formulation. 16 A good is characterized by jointness in consumption if 
many consumers may use a given number of units of the good at the 
same time without diminishing the utility each derives from con-
sumption. For instance, several dozen cross-country skiers may 
simultaneously use a hundred-acre forest without ever encountering 
one another and thereby diminishing the pleasure of another's ex-
perience. Three thousand simultaneous skiers would undoubtedly in-
vade each other's serenity, however. For the pure public good, any 
number of simultaneous users may consume the resource without in-
terfering with one another's consumption. Because this extreme 
situation seems implausible, we look at goods as "congestible," that 
is, susceptible of being overcrowded in the forest example, or, in 
general, having the characteristic that if too many people consume 
the same limited resources simultaneously, they will interfere with 
the benefit derived by each.16 In essence, then, the theory of con-
gestible public goods describes the derivation of a relationship be-
tween the benefits received by each consumer from the supply of a 
15. For more examples of jointness in congestible public goods, see infra text at note 16. 
16. See, e.g., Inman, A Generalized Congestion Function for Highway Travel, 5 J. OF URBAN 
ECON. 21·34 (1978). The author described the relationship between these three variables in the 
context of a public highway. His exercise is formulated in terms of the benefits flowing to the 
user, B, as a function of facility size, i.e., the number of units, X, and the number of 
simultaneous highway users, N; B - g(X,N). He hypothesized that for highway travel, where B 
is speed (benefits per user) in miles per hour, N is volume of traffic (number of simultaneous 
users), and X is highway scale, one would observe that as the volume of traffic increased the 
flow of benefits would decrease and at an accelerating rate, i.e., dBldN<O, dIB/dN1<O. 
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good, the number of units of the good supplied, and the number of 
simultaneous consumers of the good. 
In the context of a regulated resource such as clean air, the level of 
benefits per user is described in general terms by the preamble to the 
Clean Air Act as that level of purity needed to protect the public 
health and welfare and the productive capacity of the Nation's 
population.17 The level of benefits may be more precisely determined 
by reference to the national primary and secondary ambient air 
quality standards, the national standards for hazardous air 
pollutants, and state and local air quality standards. In this same 
context, the number of simultaneous consumers is that number of 
economic agents permitted to use (decrease the supply of) clean air 
during the same time period. These consumers may be firms or in-
dividuals and their consumption may result either in a considerable 
or de minimis decrease in air quality, or, as it might be viewed, in the 
quantity of clean air. Breathers of the air, for instance, are consum-
ers in that they consume quantities of clean air and emit pollutants; 
but their overall impact on this congestible public good is negligible. 
The quantity of the congestible public good supplied for a given set 
of geographic and meteorological conditions describing a body of am-
bient air will depend on the amount of clean air "produced." Clean 
air is produced (increased in quantity) by removing pollutants from 
emissions - "cleaner air" means "more units of the good clean air." 
As for any other production process, a functional relationship can 
theoretically be derived between the quantity of clean air made 
available to consumers and inputs into the production process by pro-
ducers (including but not limited to pollution control devices).18 
2. Combining Consumption Characteristics With Property Rights 
Notions: The Resource Cost Curve 
A resource cost curve which indicates the number of units of a 
good required to provide a given level of benefits per consumer for 
varying numbers of simultaneous consumers handily captures the 
jointness characteristics of the regulated resource in question. For 
example, for twelve consumers each to derive pleasure from a lolli-
17. 42 U.S.C. S 7401 (1976 & Supp. Pamph. 1981). 
18. Regulators are required under the Clean Air Act to derive such a functional relationship 
in the process of evaluating permits for constructing or modifying stationary sources which 
will have the potential to emit quantities of pollutants over a specified minimum. See, for in-
stance 42 U.S.C. S 7475 (1976 & Supp. Pamph. 1981). 
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pop, each must have his own lollipop. For twelve consumers each to 
derive pleasure from a candle, perhaps just one candle will suffice be-
cause all can share in the light from the flame. A curve on a graph de-
picting the number of lollipops necessary to provide a given level of 
benefit to consumers will necessarily increase as the number of con-
sumers increases. By contrast, the resource cost curve for candles 
need not increase over some (perhaps small) number of simultaneous 
consumers. In this lollipop/candle example, the jointness characteris-
tic describes the ability of simultaneous consumers to share the con-
gestible good. Sharing a candle with others decreases the benefit 
received by each consumer less than sharing a lollipop does. 
In general terms, it can be said that for a given regulated resource 
the benefits per user are a function of the number of units of the 
resource available and the number of simultaneous consumers. Thus, 
we would generally expect the "benefits function" to increase with 
the number of units supplied, depending on how the good enters the 
utility functions of consumers, and to decrease with the number of 
simultaneous consumers, depending on the jointness properties of 
the good. Often, as with the Clean Air Act, we wish to examine alter-
native institutional structures, i.e., different property rights 
assignments, through which a given level of benefits is provided to 
each consumer. The resource cost curve depicting the relationship 
between the number of units of the congestible good and the number 
of simultaneous consumers for a given level of benefits describes the 
"consumption characteristics" of the good. For the typical congesti-
ble public good, the number of units of the good required to provide a 
given level of benefits will, at least after the point where "conges-
tion" sets in, be an increasing function of the number of si-
multaneous consumers for a given level of benefits. 19 Each consumer 
of a congestible public good, i.e., a good characterized by less than 
perfect jointness, has a negative impact on the level of benefits deriv-
able by others from a fixed supply of the resource. Beyond some fi-
nite number of consumers of the candle (or even better, a swimming 
19. J.e. Head characterized the congestible public good as a good for which a given unit, 
once produced, can be made at least partially available, though in varying degrees of quality, 
to more than one individual. The benefits flowing to one consumer from the provision of one 
unit of the congestible public good are not totally eliminated by the simultaneous consumption 
of others. Head, Public Goods and Public Policy, 17 PUBLIC FINANCE 197-221 (1962). 
----------------
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pool) additional consumers (sharers of the candle's light or fellow 
swimmers) will detrimentally affect the others' enjoyment of the 
resource. The point at which the addition of more consumers begins 
to affect others' enjoyment is called the congestion point. 
Property rights notions can be incorporated into this consumption 
relationship to expand our understanding of the impact of institu-
tional structure on consumption characteristics. A number of rele-
vant characteristics of any property rights assignment can be 
described under four general categories or component parts of the 
assignment, labeled the direction (D), inclusiveness (I), content (C), 
and sanction (S) components. These components of an assignment 
describe respectively what types of users may consume the supply of 
the resource, how many may simul~neously consume the resource, 
the level of benefits to which each consumer is entitled, and how one 
may protect one's right to consume the resource. 
A resource cost curve graphically describing the consumption 
characteristics can be drawn for any given property rights assign-
ment fully specified with respect to its direction and content. The 
inclusiveness characteristic (number of simultaneous consumers) is 
represented by a particular point on the resource cost curve which 
indicates for various numbers of consumers, N, the number of units 
of the good, x, needed to provide a given level of benefits, B. A 
change in the inclusiveness of the property rights assignment for 
consumers, usus, is represented by a movement along the resource 
cost curve to a higher or lower number of consumers. The sanction 
component relates not to consumption properties directly but how 
the right to usus is to be enforced. A change in the sanction compo-
nent will have no direct impact on the resource cost curve; it is con-
sidered at another point in the analysis. 20 
Figure 1 depicts a resource cost curve, RCo, for a given property 
rights assignment with respect to usus, ~, which is specified by its 
four component parts, Do, Co, 1°, So. The shape of the curve will de-
pend on the consumption characteristics of the resource, specifically, 
the jointness properties. The jointness property describes the degree 
to which consumption by one consumer interferes with simultaneous 
consumption by others. Perfect jointness occurs when consumption 
20. See infra text and notes at notes 23-28. 
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by one does not decrease the benefits others derive from their simul-
taneous consumption of the same units of the resource. 
In Figure 1, for example, for any number of consumers between 
zero (0) and N"r, the resource is characterized by perfect jointness. 
The level of benefits each consumer derives from his sumultaneous 
consumption of x units of the resource is unaffected by simultaneous 
consumption by up to Nc additional consumers. Our hypothetical 
resource may be trout stocked in a fishing pond. Simultaneous fly-
fishing by a limited number of other anglers will not decrease the 
benefits (perhaps measured in probability of catching a fish) which 
each angler derives. But an increase in the number of fishermen 
beyond Nc necessitates an increase in the number of fish stocked in 
order to maintain the same probability that each will catch a fish. 
The point at which the resource cost curve is not differentiable, that 
is, where the resource cost curve starts to curve upwards after being 
straight, (Nc ,XO), is defined as the congestion point. 
The resource cost curve can be derived for goods with any 
characteristics ranging from pure private goods through in-
termediate and congestible goods to pure public goods. None of these 
variations causes any particular difficulty for the analysis. Note, for 
instance, the curve labeled RCo in Figure 2. The good described in 
resource cost curve RCo is neither purely public, purely private, nor 
traditionally congestible in the sense that there is a nondifferentiable 
congestion point. It has no range of increasing number of consumers 
over which the number of units of the good need not increase to 
maintain the level of benefits per person as for the public or congesti-
bie good. This intermediate good reflects Head's description 
of being available, though in varying degrees of quality, to more than 
one consumer.21 In this example, to maintain quality, the number of 
units of the good must be increased continuously but at a rate slower 
than the rate of increase in numbers of consumers.22 
A change in the property rights assignment will alter the jointness 
characteristics of the resource and cause a shift in the curve. Choices 
among alternative types of consumers can be compared by the "in-
tensity" of use by various types. Intensity of use describes the 
severity or degree of interference by a particular type of consumer 
with the simultaneous consumption of others. By his use of the 
21. Head, 8'Upra note 19, at 197-22l. 
22. This is reflected by drawing a resource cost curve with a slope between zero and one, as 
shown. 
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Resource Cost Curves Reflecting Changes in 
Property Rights Specifications 
x 
~--------~------~----------------N o N" 
Number of 
Simultaneous 
Consumers 
Key: RCO = RCo; &: (Do, cj 
RCI = RCI; RJ (Dl, cj 
RC2 = RC2; RJ(Do, Cl) 
593 
RC" 
where the changing superscripts indicate a change in the curve, RC, due to a 
change in the property rights assignment, Rib which affects its shape and 
location. The change in property rights is due to a change in one or more com-
ponents of the right, as from DO to DI or CO to Cl . 
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A Possible Resource Cost Curve for an 
Intermediate Good 
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resource, the more intensive consumer causes a greater decrease in 
the level of benefits derived by simultaneous consumers than does 
the less intensive consumer. Thus, in Figure 1, if more intensive con-
sumers are permitted to make use of the resource, the congestion 
point will be further to the left, for example, at N~ rather than NC. 
The curve reflecting the consumption characteristics given this 
change in the direction of the property rights assignment is labeled 
RCI. 
In the fishing pond example, a change in direction may be made by 
permitting fishermen trolling lures behind motorboats to join the fly 
fishermen in the fun. Previously as many as the number Nc anglers 
could fly-fish without congesting (interfering with each other's use 
of) the resource. Now, because a number of new consumers, trollers, 
less than Nc may interfere with the chances of fly fishermen catching 
fish, the new congestion point (N~, xo) is to the left of the old conges-
tion point. This shift in the consumption curve is a result of a change 
in the direction of the right to usus. 
A change in the content of the property rights assignment will also 
shift the resource cost curve. The curve describes the number of 
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units of the resource needed to provide a given level of benefits to 
each consumer. If the level of benefits, implied by the content compo-
nent of the property rights assignment, is increased, more units of 
the good must be supplied for any given number of simultaneous con-
sumers. The curve RC2 in Figure 1 reflects increase in the content 
component of the property right assignment with respect to usus. 
For example, this change might represent a decision to increase the 
probability that each fisherman will catch at least one fish, or to in-
crease the number of fish each is likely to catch. 
B. Property Rights and Enforcement-Related 
Properties of Resources 
The public goods notion of nonexcludability is relevant to the en-
forcement cost issue. Nonexcludability is the inability of the pro-
ducer, due to physical and legal barriers, to enforce the right to ap-
propriate the full social benefits realized from its supply of goods, the 
right to usus fructus. 23 This lack of effective exclusive control 
also extends to consumers who, having acquired a number of units of 
goods for their own consumption, are unable to prevent others from 
consuming those units because they lack effective exclusive use. 
Generally, both the rights to usus and ususfructus must be enforced. 
For public goods with complete jointness in consumption and from 
which consumers cannot be excluded, however, only the usus fructus 
needs to be enforced. Once these complete jointness goods are pro-
duced, consumers are guaranteed to receive the associated benefits 
from consumption; simultaneous consumption by others does not 
limit the benefits they derive and others cannot be legally or 
physically prevented from simultaneously consuming. 24 
23. Nonexcludability is traditionally presented as a physical inability to prevent non-paying 
consumers from benefiting from the provision of goods, e.g., the outdoor circus, national 
defenses, lighthouses. Ronald Coase examined the possibility of private provision of tradi-
tionally nonexcludable resources by altering the legal structure. Coase, The Lighthouse in 
Economics, 17 J. OF LAW & ECON. 357-76 (1974). James M. Buchanan similarly argues that, 
given sufficient flexibility in the assignment of legal rights, physical exclusion is possible in 
almost all imaginable cases. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 1-14 
(1965). Both the natural and physical properties of goods and the availability of suitable legal 
rights are relevant to nonexcludability. Because the degree of nonexcludability affects the en" 
forcement costs, both aspects must be considered. 
24. As we will see, clean air is such a good. Once clean air is produced (by cleaning emis-
sions) breathers of the air can not be excluded from benefiting. If those who clean up the air 
have a right to be paid for this costly productive activity, they will have to enforce this right to 
usus fructus. 
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If a resource is characterized by complete nonexcludability then 
the producer to whom the usus fructus has been assigned and the 
consumer to whom the usus has been assigned will be unable at any 
cost to prevent non-entitled producers and consumers from 
benefiting from the provision or acquisition of the good. Degrees of 
nonexcludability imply different amounts of enforcement "effort" 
required to protect one's right to appropriate returns or to consume. 
The model presented here quantifies this effort by determining the 
number of enforcement units necessary to protect one's right given 
both the natural or physical characteristics of the resource and the 
relevant legal milieu. 
1. Enforcement Units 
It is reasonable to suppose, at least initially, that the number of en-
forcement units required increases as the number of units of the 
resource the rights to which are to be protected increases. Thus, if 
the number of enforcement units, designated eu, were a function 
only of the number of units of the good to be protected one could 
describe an upward sloping enforcement curve such as EUo depicted 
in Figure 3. It is possible that after some point there will be 
economies of scale that cause the rate of increase in the number of 
required enforcement units to decrease as one endeavors to protect 
rights to larger numbers of units of the good. This is not, however, a 
necessary conclusion. There may instead be diseconomies of scale. 
The number of enforcement units needed and the presence of 
economies or diseconomies of scale will depend on the nature of the 
resource, that is, the physical or natural barriers to enforcing one's 
rights, as well as on legal restrictions. The nonexcludability 
characteristics of the resource stemming from natural and legal bar-
riers are embodied in an enforcement relation which associates the 
number of units of the resource the rights to which are being pro-
tected to the number of enforcement units required to protect them. 
Figure 3 portrays an enforcement relation labeled EUo which in-
dicates that the number of enforcement units required depends on 
both the number of units of the resource, x, and the given property 
rights system with respect to usus, Ra, and usus fructus, Rllr. 
Enforcement units, eu, measured on the abscissa axis, are identi-
cally comprised technological inputs to the enforcement process. A 
simple example of an enforcement unit is a watchperson and dog. 
Each unit is identically composed of one watchperson and one dog. 
This combination of inputs underlies a single enforcement relation, 
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that is, a single technology which is unvaried as different numbers of 
units of the good are to be protected. Each type of enforcement 
unit represents a single technology of enforcement. Different 
technologies are not compared on the same axis but may be com-
pared by relation to a common denominator such as cost per unit or 
total cost to protect a given number of units of a good. Enforcement 
relations can theoretically be derived for those enforcing the right to 
either usus or usus fructus. 
2. Enforcement Relations 
Note that by relating back to the components of property rights 
assignments - direction, content, inclusiveness, and sanctions -
one can explore how the enforcement relation shifts as changes in 
the institutions described by those property rights occur. Changes in 
any of these components will affect the number of inputs invested in 
the enforcement process. The direction of the assignment of the 
right to usus or usus fructus indicates what types of consumers and 
producers will be enforcing rights. Characteristics of the type of 
economic agent entitled to consume or appropriate returns from sup-
plying resources may imply the availability enforcement 
technologies. For example, a public or governmental body protecting 
its own property can make use of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, which is available only under limited circumstances to the 
private consumer. Assigning rights to appropriate returns from a 
productive activity - usus fructus - to a governmental unit such as 
a municipal electricity-generating plant may, on the other hand, 
restrict the technologies available because of due process considera-
tions.26 
The inclusiveness of the rights as well as market considerations 
will dictate how many consumers are entitled simultaneously to con-
sume the units of a resource and how many producers are entitled to 
appropriate returns from productive activity. The rights to usus may 
be assigned to a single consumer, as in the archetypal private goods 
case or to a group of consumers of any larger size, as for public 
parks. The rights to usus fructus may be assigned to a single pro-
ducer, as in the legal monopoly situation, or to all producers of a 
given resource. The impact of the inclusiveness of the property right 
25. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (indicating that a stricter due 
process requirement should be used for public utilities). 
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FIGURE 3 
The Enforcement Relation Indicating the Number of 
Enforcement Units Required to Protect Property Rights 
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on the enforcement relation depends on its effect on economy-of-
scale considerations, the ability to coordinate enforcement efforts, 
and on external or spillover effects of enforcement activities.26 
26. Economies of scale in enforcement means that as more units of the good are produced or 
are available to be consumed the additional effort required to protect property rights to these 
goods declines. Because the enforcement curve is a total curve rather than a marginal curve, 
economies of scale are reflected in an EU curve which increases at an increasing rate as in 
Figure 3. The extent to which this is true will vary for each good and perhaps for each enforce-
ment technology, but we can say that the ability to take advantage of economies of scale re-
quires either that one enforcer be in charge of enforcement of the rights to enough of the units 
of good that the efficiencies of scale can be obtained or that enough holders of the rights can 
coordinate their enforcement activities. 
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The content of the property right describes the benefits to be 
derived by each consumer in exercising the right of usus and by each 
producer in securing returns from productive activity. Examples of 
changes of levels of benefit on the consumption side have already 
been given.27 In that context, a higher level of benefits per user re-
quires a greater supply of the good in question. On the production 
side, the right to appropriate returns may be more or less remunera-
tive to the rights holder; it might be assigned to nonprofit as opposed 
to for-profit organizations, or to industries where the rate of return 
is otherwise regulated. The content specification, the level of bene-
fits to be secured by protecting one's right, will be a factor in deter-
mining the level of enforcement to be used to protect such rights. The 
lower the benefit from enforcing one's rights, the less one will be 
willing to invest in protecting those rights. 28 The cost-minimizing en-
forcer of rights will equate the marginal value product which 
measures the incremental resulting benefit of the additional dollar 
spent on enforcement with the marginal costs of another violation of 
his rights. 
The sanction component of the rights to usus and usus fructus may 
specify not only how enforcement activities will be organized (collec-
tively or individually, for example) but also what those enforcement 
activities will be. The property right with respect to usus may permit 
homeowners to shoot a thief on sight or require that an injunctive 
order be sought to evict the trespasser. The farmer may be permit-
ted to enforce his right to secure returns by setting land mines at the 
boundaries of the field, or he may be limited to less convincing deter-
Spillover effects, which are closely interrelated with economies of scale, can be illustrated in 
the following manner. Everyone in a neighborhood protects his home by some efforts that sup-
plement public police activities. Even though the rights to individual houses are assigned to in-
dividual homeowners, neighborhood-watch programs coordinate the efforts of neighbors to 
protect their property and may reduce total enforcement costs. Similarly, if all of one's 
neighbors participated in the neighborhood watch, that person would benefit from the pro-
gram even if he did nothing; and if another home were to be built in the neighborhood, the 
neighborhood-watch program would probably not have to expand to include this home in its 
protection. Even without coordination of their activities, if each of one's neighbors sat on his 
front porch with a shotgun, their protection would spill over to the passive person's property 
and benefit him, making his house safer from intruders even if he did nothing. These are 
spillover benefits and affect the total amount of enforcement effort needed for protection. 
27. See supra text at note 22. 
28. In a sense, this is where the theory of the costs of enforcing property rights began. In his 
1967 article, Harold Demsetz relates the impetus for redefining property rights to a change in 
the benefit-cost calculus. In this context Demsetz recognizes that enforcement costs will vary 
with the type of ownership in general terms of negotiation costs and maximization of the pres-
ent value of resources owned in these ways. Demsetz, Toward a Theory afProperty Rights, 57 
AM. EcoN. REv. 347-73 (1967). 
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rents. Whatever is the specification of how enforcement units may 
be employed, the enforcement relation describing the number of en-
forcement units needed to provide a given level of protection will be 
affected. 
As changes in any of the components of the rights - direction, in-
clusiveness, content, and sanction - occur, the enforcement relation 
described in Figure 3 will shift. This enforcement relation is a func-
tion, therefore, not only of the number of units of the resource the 
rights to which are being protected, but also of the given specifica-
tions of the rights to usus, R8, and usus fructus, Rllf. In evaluating the 
impact on the level of enforcement costs of changes in property 
rights assignments, various considerations are relevant. These in-
clude the impacts on the ability to achieve such economies of scale in 
enforcement as are available; impacts on the productivity of a partic-
ular enforcement technology for each configuration of property 
rights components; impacts on the ability of economic agents of dif-
ferent numbers and of different types to coordinate efforts and to 
exploit alternative technologies; impacts on the level of protection 
that will minimize costs for a given enforcer of rights; and impacts 
on the external effects of each enforcer's activities. 
For a particular policy problem, the enforcement relation will de-
scribe the total investment in a single specific enforcement technol-
ogy necessary to protect all units made available to a given group of 
simultaneous consumers. Amendments to the rights assignment, 
changes in the specifications of a given property right, are reflected 
in shifts of the enforcement curve. For instance, the curve EDo in 
Figure 3 may represent the relationship between the number of fish 
stocked in the pond by all producers of fish and the number of watch-
person-dog teams required to ensure that the suppliers get paid by 
all fishermen who catch their fish. Assume that a producer only col-
lects when one of his fish is caught. EDI describes the result of a 
change in the inclusiveness of the property rights assignment with 
respect to usus fructus. If one producer supplies all of the fish, that 
is, the right to be paid for this productive activity is assigned to one 
individual (rights to ususfructus are completely exclusive or "nonin-
clusive"), fewer enforcement units will be needed to enforce the 
rights to returns from supply relative to the situation where many 
producers were involved (more inclusive ususfructus rights). Among 
other sources of savings in the single producer situation is the fact 
that the producer need not inspect a recently hooked trout to see if 
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he supplied it because he supplied all of them. The result is an en-
forcement curve, EV!, above and to the left of the previous curve, 
EVo, representing more efficient enforcement. 
Similar property rights changes and descriptions of the effects of 
such changes on the enforcement curve can be presented for the 
direction, content, and sanction components of the rights assign-
ment. For instance, a shift in the enforcement relation similar to that 
in Figure 3 indicating more efficient enforcement might occur if the 
sanction component of the property right were to specify that the 
producers' rights to usus fructus would be enforced by a collectivity 
such as the government. In that case, one enforcement organization 
would arrange to collect fees from all users of the good supplied and 
allocate those fees to the producers. An alternative specification 
might forbid producers from combining or conspiring for any 
business purpose, including enforcement, thereby requiring ineffi-
cient individualized enforcement efforts.29 Generally, the effect of 
such a scheme would be to shift the enforcement curve below and to 
the right of EVo representing an increase in the number of enforce-
ment units relative to the number of units of the resource protected. 
V sing these concepts for policy purposes requires a method for 
comparing enforcement strategies which can examine the implica-
tions of different property rights systems with respect to those en-
forcement strategies. Determining the magnitude of the enforce-
ment effort in dollar cost terms would allow the policymaker to make 
these comparisons of strategies for the purpose of enforcement 
policy planning. The discussion therefore now turns to a further ex-
amination of the operation and function of this enforcement strategy 
methodology. 
III. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ENFORCEMENT 
POLICY PLANNING 
A. The Level of Costs 
1. The Enforcement Input Cost Curve 
The common denominator for comparing enforcement technol-
ogies is the dollar costs of employing inputs (enforcement units) to 
29. For example, antitrust considerations may prevent certain concentrations of enforce-
ment resources. 
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the overall enforcement process. For each enforcement technology 
the cost per unit can be calculated. An enforcement input cost curve 
can be drawn describing the dollar cost of acquiring the inputs to the 
enforcement process in the fixed proportion specified by the given 
technology underlying the enforcement relationship and including 
the costs of administrative as well as other inputs. If changes in 
quantity demanded for these inputs do not affect the price at which 
the inputs are supplied, then the enforcement input cost relationship 
will be linear and represented as a ray as shown, for example, by 
EICl in Figure 4. The ray will begin at the origin of the axes and 
have a slope equal to the dollar cost of the inputs comprising one en-
forcement unit. This will be the case where the quantity of enforce-
ment efforts demanded by the enforcers of the rights is small 
relative to total market demand. 
Where inputs are specialized to a particular enforcement process 
the input cost relationship may reflect an upward sloping nature of 
the supply curve facing the purchaser of enforcement inputs. In the 
context of clean air, for instance, if the Orsat analyzer, used to make 
a dry molecular weight determination of samples of gases taken 
from smokestacks, is not used for any other purpose or by anyone 
but the Environmental Protection Agency enforcers of clean air 
property rights, then the cost per unit may change as the quantity of 
clean air demanded increases. In Figure 4, EIC2 reflects a case 
where any increases in quantity of the good demanded by the en-
forcer are large enough to be forthcoming from suppliers only at 
higher prices. 
Generally, the enforcement input cost curve will describe the 
changes in the cost of acquiring the inputs required by a particular 
enforcement technology as the number of enforcement units in-
creases. It is estimated by reference to market input costs. The quan-
tities demanded by enforcers relative to market demand and the sup-
ply elasticities will be relevant considerations. 
2. The Derivation of an Enforcement Planning Curve 
From the resource cost, enforcement, and enforcement input cost 
relationships determined by reference to the various components of 
the property rights assignment and the public goods charactistics of 
the resource as well as market considerations, an enforcement plan-
ning schedule can be derived. For any choice of institutional struc-
ture, the planning schedule indicates the dollar costs associated with 
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enforcing a particular property rights assignment and concisely 
summarizes information contained in the previously described rela-
tionships. 
This planning schedule can be derived graphically for a given set of 
property rights as follows. In the simple example shown in Figure 5, 
it is assumed that the same technology is used for the enforcement of 
the rights to usus and ususfructus. Given the property rights assign-
ment with respect to usus for any given number of users, NI, the 
resource cost curve in Quadrant I of Figure 5 yields the number of 
units of the resource, Xl, needed to provide a given level of benefits 
specified in RCo. The enforcement curves in Quadrant II reveal that 
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enforcing the right to appropriate returns from the production of Xl 
units of the good using the specified technology requires eu& units of 
enforcement, while the enforcement of the right to consume requires 
eu~ enforcement units. Assuming that there are no spillovers from 
the enforcement of usus to the enforcement of usus fructus or vice 
versa, a total of eul ( = eu~ + eu&) enforcement units will be needed to 
enforce fully all rights with respect to Xl units of the good. The en-
forcement input cost curve in Quadrant III reveals that the total 
number of enforcement units can be obtained at cost of EIO which 
reflects the total enforcement costs in dollar terms to all enforcers of 
both rights. The enforcement planning curve in Quadrant IV pre-
sents the unique association between the number of users to whom 
the right to consume is assigned and the total cost of ensuring that 
the flow of benefits to those entitled consumers and producers is pro-
tected. 
This operation of tracing through the various curves can be carried 
out for all numbers of potential users. The resulting enforcement 
planning curve Epo describes how the level of enforcement costs 
changes as the number of users changes. The shape of this curve is 
determined by the jointness and excludability characteristics of the 
resource, the property rights assignments, the enforcement technol-
ogy, and market factors. Thus, public goods theory, property rights 
theory, and relevant features of a particular enforcement problem 
are combined in the enforcement planning curve. 
3. Comparing Alternative Techniques of Enforcement 
In the simple case presented the technology relied upon to enforce 
the rights of both usus and usus fructus is assumed to be the same. 
As such, the enforcement technology is assumed to remain constant 
even when there is an increase in the number of units of the good 
and, consequently, in the corresponding rights to be protected. In 
the usual planning process, however, the policymaker will want to 
consider and compare the costs of alternative technologies for 
enforcement, both as the number of units of the good provided in-
creases and as the requirements for enforcing usus and usus fructus 
differ. The enforcement planning curve described above is a device 
for making these comparisons and for evaluating different technolo-
gies required for enforcing different rights. 
Consider the comparison of alternative technologies for enforce-
ment of a single right. Figure 6 depicts enforcement relationships 
that describe, for three different types of enforcement technologies, 
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FIGURE 5 
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the number of enforcement units required to enforce the right to use 
fishing ponds of varying sizes. The ordinate axis in each curve 
represents the number of units of the good to be consumed (the size 
of the pond in circumference) while the abscissa measures the 
number of enforcement units of each type used to detect intruders. 
Because an enforcement curve must be drawn for each technology, 
there are three sets of axes as well as three associated enforcement 
input (enforcement unit) cost curves. The pair of curves labeled 
"Technology A" represents the watchperson-dog technology which 
is effective for small ponds but becomes increasingly expensive in re-
source terms for larger ponds, as the shape of the curve in the upper 
graph reflects. Technology B is the watchperson/motorboat technol-
ogy which, as the curve reflects, requires a much higher number of 
enforcement units per acre for small ponds than for large ponds. 
Technology C describes the photoelectric cell technology for detect-
ing intruders and reflects a per unit resource investment that in-
creases at a constant rate as the size of the pond increases. The costs 
per enforcement unit, which vary as indicated by the lower three 
curves in Figure 6, are constant per unit as quantity demand in-
creases, except for the specially designed photoelectric cell, the sup-
ply of which is obtained at increasing costs per unit. 
While the enforcement curves and enforcement input cost curves 
for the alternative technologies must be drawn on separate sets of 
axes, the enforcement planning curves from each can be compared 
on the same diagram. Figure 7 presents the enforcement planning 
curves for the alternative technologies A, B, and C. Note that the 
characteristics of the three enforcement technologies are reflected 
in the individual diagrams in Quadrants IIA, lIB, and IIC but may be 
compared as to cost by examining the planning curves in Quadrant 
IV. In Quadrant IV, the heavy line indicates the technology of mini-
mum cost for fully enforcing the rights of various numbers of users 
of the good in question. This example reveals that, in order to mini-
mize cost, one may have to switch to a different enforcement tech-
nology as the number of consumers grows larger or smaller. ThiL 
device enables the policymaker to choose among alternative technol-
ogies for a given set of property rights. Thus, as seen in Quadrant IV 
of Figure 7, if there are to be fewer than Nl users of the resource, 
technology A is cost minimizing. For any number of consumers be-
tween Nl and N2 technology B is the least expensive. If there are 
more than N2 users, technology C is the least expensive. 
The enforcement planning curve is the construct of particular utili-
ty to those who wish to balance the costs and benefits of a specific 
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institutional structure. An analysis which examines the character-
istics of the resource cost curve, the enforcement relations, and the 
total cost curve as well as the way changes in the property rights 
assignments affect those relationships sheds light on why the cost of 
enforcing rights varies in a systematic way with alternative property 
rights assignments. The use of an enforcement planning curve pro-
vides a bottom line. It provides a means of comparing the enforce-
ment cost associated with different institutional choices and varying 
technological constraints. 
B. Choosing the Degree of Protection 
The discussion to this point has assumed that the persons assigned 
the rights of usus fructus desire to enforce those rights fully by en-
suring that there are absolutely no violations. While a wide variety of 
relationships can now be examined by using the enforcement cost 
model just described, the model has not yet explicitly recognized a 
number of important features in the enforcement cost picture - not-
ably, how the benefits from enforcing and violating the rights assign-
ment will affect the costs of enforcement. Quite reasonably, the 
crime and punishment literature in economics takes issue with the 
naive assumption that property rights are fully enforced. As influen-
tial as any in this discussion are the contributions of Gary Becker30 
and George Stigler.s1 
Rather than take a property rights approach to the enforcement 
problem, Becker sought to answer the normative question "how 
many resources and how much punishment should be used to enforce 
different kinds of legislation?"S2 Becker and Stigler rely on the 
economic nature of crime to determine how many violations will oc-
cur. Two examples of this economic nature of crime can be presented 
in terms familiar to the property rights approach. A violation of the 
rights to usus is the using or consuming of a good to which the user 
or consumer has not been assigned a right. This violator is taking the 
economic benefit to be derived from consumption without any right 
to do so. A violation of the right to usus fructus is the failure to pay 
to the party assigned that right the returns due him from his produc-
tive activity. An economic motivation may be one of the reasons for 
the violation of this right. 
30. Becker, supra note 9, at 169. 
31. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Law, 78 J. OF POL. ECON. 526 (1970). 
32. Becker, supra note 9, at 170. 
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Less than full enforcement may occur for a variety of reasons. 
Significant among these are that the amount of money available 
(budgeted, in an administrative context) for purchasing enforcement 
units is limited, and that full enforcement may not maximize the 
goals of the enforcer, whatever they may be. The first of the two 
reasons is straightforward and is related to the second. Because 
resources for enforcement are limited, the enforcer will seek to use 
only as many as are worthwhile. That is, if the costs of employing 
another lmil. of enforcement exceed the additional benefits to be 
gained thereby, the employment of that unit of enforcement will not 
be worthwhile. This explanation of less than full enforcement is a 
simple benefit maximizing model. 
The optimization rule for efficient level of enforcement is for the 
rights holder or his agent, the enforcer, to the extent their incentives 
are identical, to maximize the benefits derived from the units of the 
resource supplied minus two costs: the harm from violations of the 
right plus enforcement costs. The benefits derived from production 
and consumption are implied in the content component of the proper-
ty rights assignment. The cost of enforcement units is available from 
the enforcement input cost curve. The harm resulting from viola-
tions is related to the benefits to be derived from production and con-
sumption. 
To determine the optimal degree of protection to be afforded a 
given set of property rights, it is necessary to establish a relationship 
between the number of enforcement units used and the number of 
rights violations that occur. A "violation" is interpreted as an 
unauthorized transfer of the benefits from consumption or produc-
tion of one unit of the resource from the rights holder to the 
"violator." For simplicity, assume that a fixed amount of loss of 
benefits, hO, results from each violation. The number of violations, V, 
is a function of both the number of units of the good available, x, and 
the number of enforcement units actually employed, eu; that is, 
V = v(x, eu). ss The total harm may be simplistically described as the 
33. Note that this functional form implies that one particular kind of enforcement 
technology represented by eu is used. More or fewer violations might occur if a different type 
of enforcement technology is employed. It is possible to use the optimization process to deter-
mine the appropriate number of units of each type of enforcement team when more than one 
enforcement technology is used either to enforce a given kind of right or to enforce the dif-
ferent rights. Such an optimization would reveal that the maximum net benefit will be 
achieved when possessors of the rights employ the enforcement units of each type until the 
marginal cost of hiring another unit of each type is equal to the marginal cost of hiring each 
other type and equal to the additional harm to holders of the rights being protected. 
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product of the number of violations times the benefits cost per viola-
tion, h times V. Equally important in the cost calculus is the harm to 
society caused by having to devote resources to enforcement. En-
forcement input costs will increase as the number of enforcement 
units employed increases. 
Balanced against the harm resulting from violations and from 
devoting otherwise productive resources to enforcement are the 
benefits derived by the rights holders, which are a function of the 
property rights assignment, particularly the number of units of the 
good involved and the number of simultaneous holders of the right. 
For any point on the resource cost curve, the optimal level of en-
forcement is the utilization of that number of enforcement units 
which equates the reduction in harm from decreasing violations 
through the employment of another enforcement unit, the 
"marginal benefit product," with the marginal cost of that additional 
enforcement unit. The collection of the optimal number of enforce-
ment units for different points on the resource cost curve defines an 
optimal enforcement relation between the number of units of the 
resource supplied and the number of enforcement units used. This 
relationship describes the optimal degree of protection of one's 
assigned property right. 84 
The net gain maximization indicates that the rational enforcer 
would invest in additional enforcement units until the incremental 
cost of adding another unit equals the value of the harm prevented 
thereby. The marginal conditions for maximizing the net gain func-
tion are satisfied at the intersection of the well-behaved marginal 
harm and cost curves in Figure 8. In this figure, the line Ceu repre-
34. Because there are many sources of cost in the enforcement process and numerous alter-
native strategies, it would be useful to be able to consider these costs individually. Using the 
maximization approach, we can break down the enforcement process to study a particular type 
of cost. For instance, Becker analyzes the impact of severity of punishment on deterrence. See 
Becker, supra note 9, at 170-75. We can examine this factor by separating from other enforce-
ment costs the costs associated with levying penalties; courts, trials, jails, fines, even social 
costs of incarceration. If Cl is a function describing the cost of other enforcement units and C2 
describes costs associated with levying punishments, P, then the maximization problem 
becomes: max L= b(x;N) - ho v(x, eu, P) - Cl(eu) - C2(P). 
In this formula, in calculating the net gain to pollution control we subtract from the benefits, 
b, which are a function of the number of units of the goods supplied, x, and the number of 
simultaneous users, N, both the harm, h, resulting from violations of the regulations, v, which 
are a function of the amount of pollution reduction expense which emitters must bear, x, the 
level of enforcement activity, eu, and punishments for those violators apprehended, P, as well 
as the costs of the enforcement Cl (eu) and of the punishments, O(P). The relevant first order 
conditions are: 
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sents constant marginal costs of employing enforcement units; the 
curves h V eu represent the combinations of declining violations and 
associated harms as more enforcement units are employed. For the 
curves Ceu and hlV~u, the number of enforcement units at the point of 
intersection, eu'" , represents the benefit maximizing level of enforce-
ment for a particular property rights assignment. The corresponding 
intersection points of the other curves with Ceu at eu1 and eu2 repre-
sent the benefit maximizing levels of enforcement for the property 
rights structures embodied in those curves. 
This graph is useful in demonstrating that changes in the property 
rights assignment affect the optimal number of enforcement units 
employed. If there is an exogenous increase in the benefit to be 
derived from each unit of the resource and, consequently, the harm 
resulting from a violation of the right to that unit increases (for ex-
ample, the EPA determines that the reduction of pollution by one 
percent not only prolongs your life but improves your sex life), then 
the marginal harm curve, hlV~, will shift to the right, becoming 
h2V~, reflecting an increase in additional harm per violation. 
There is no reason to assume an increase in violations from this ex-
ample, but if violations per enforcement unit were to increase, then 
the marginal harm curve would be less steep, reflecting a smaller 
decrease in violations per additional enforcement unit, as in h2V~u. 
Each of the changes affects the optimal number of enforcement 
units and in turn, therefore, affects both the enforcement curve and 
the enforcement planning curve. Similar shifts can be demonstrated 
for changes in the other components of the property rights struc-
ture. 
In general, the number of units of enforcement that maximizes net 
benefits for a given number of units of the good and enforcement 
technology, including punishment, will be less than the number re-
dLldP .. - ho (dv/dP) -dc2ldP .. 0 or - ho (vp) .. c~ 
and dL/deu '"' - ho (dv/deu) - dCl/deu .. 0 or - hO (veo> = c~. 
These formulae mean that the investment in punishments should be raised until the reduc-
tion in harm from decreasing violations equals the increase in associated costs. Becker notes 
that there will be costs associated with levying the fine that may not be borne by the enforcer. 
The policymaker is encouraged to include fairness (or the costs of unfairness.), due process, 
equity,)and other such considerations in the balancing process. Becker also notes a trade-off 
between increasing the number of enforcement units and changing the severity of the punish-
ment. Many portions of his model can be incorporated into this analysis. 
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FIGURE 8 
Optimal Levels of Rights Enforcement Activity 
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quired to enforce the property rights fully. This can be seen in 
Quadrant II of Figure 9. Full enforcement (no violations) will not oc-
cur unless the harm from an additional violation is high. Only where 
the cost of harm from an additional violation is exceedingly high is 
there likely to be a correlation between the cost of enforcement and 
the value of the reduction of violations such that maximum net 
benefit is derived only when no violations occur. Under the optimal 
enforcement strategy, enforcement units will be employed until the 
dollar cost of reducing additional violations reaches that high 
amount of harm from a violation. An examination of a particular cost 
function and enforcement technology will yield the appropriate 
degree of enforcement necessary to maximize net benefits. The ef-
fect of choosing a less-than-full enforcement curve is to shift the en-
forcement planning curve downwards and to the right as in 
Quadrant IV of Figure 9. 
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FIGURE 9 
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IV. PROPERTY RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT IN A 
REGULATORY CONTEXT 
A. Introduction 
Number Assigned 
rights 
Property rights with respect to clean air are established by a va-
riety of administrative, legislative, and judicial bodies on federal, 
state, and local levels. A particular regulatory scheme can be 
described by the model developed above and the enforcement cost 
implications of altering the property rights implicit in a particular 
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regulatory institutional structure can be analyzed. As an example, 
this section considers the regulations promulgated under the Clean 
Air Act to control pollution from stationary sources. 
The resource cost curve in this context, as in the general model, 
describes the number of units of the good needed to provide a given 
level of benefits to varying numbers of simultaneous consumers. In 
the context of the Clean Air Act, consumers of the air are of two 
types which may be broadly categorized as breathers and emitters. 
The statute itself provides a definitional distinction between the two 
groups. Section 109 of the Act3S describes primary and secondary 
standards as those air quality standards necessary to protect the 
public health and the public welfare from any known or anticipated 
adverse effects associated with the presence of such air pollutant in 
the ambient air. Breathers are those for whose benefit the standards 
are designed - those whose health and welfare is endangered by air-
borne pollution. Emitters are those whose consumption of clean air 
endangers the breathers. 
The Clean Air Act regulations for a particular air quality control 
region are promulgated without regard to the number of breathers 
in a particular region. The level of benefits described in the national 
primary and secondary standards is uniform across the country. 
Rules designed to prevent significant deterioration of air quality 
designate areas as clean or dirty air areas according to a plan of 
projected desirable use or non-use. The designation of an area as 
"dirty" could be associated with the presence of large numbers of 
breathers, as in an urban center, but the classification actually 
results from the emitters' activities, not the breathers' presence. 
Because the number of "simultaneous breathers" is not relevant to 
the regulatory scheme, the horizontal axis of the resource cost curve 
diagram measures only the number of simultaneous emitters. The 
number of breathers is outside of the model not because of the way 
the model is designed but because of the regulatory design which is 
directed only to emitters. 
To reflect enforcement cost characteristics accurately, the model 
must describe the actual property rights structure embodied in the 
standards and regulations.36 As will be shown, the cost of reducing 
pollution depends only on the constraints imposed on the production 
process of emitters and the cost of enforcement depends only on the 
35. 42 U.S.C. S 7409 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
36. See id., SS 7409, 7411, 7412; 40 C.F.R. Parts 50-99 (1980). 
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emitters' strategies of compliance or violation. While the enforcer's 
decision whether to pursue a particular violator may actually depend 
on the number of breathers who are affected by the pollution,37 the 
regulations setting forth performance standards do not take into ac-
count the number of breathers.38 This is so because clean air regula-
tions operate by ensuring that emitters reduce pollution - produce 
units of pollution reduction - which in turn increases the amount of 
clean air available to all. As a congestible public good characterized 
by jointness and nonexcludability, the clean air "produced" by 
regulated emitters is then consumed by breathers, who do not in-
terfere with each other's consumption and cannot be excluded from 
deriving the benefits of clean air. Emitters are "regulated" - forced 
to produce pollution reduction - because the return from such pro-
duction is negative in the sense that emitters, as producers of clean 
air, bear the cost of pollution reduction without recompense except 
to the extent that these producers can pass the cost on to buyers of 
their products. If all costs could be passed on, and the producer suf-
fered no loss of profit, the emitter would not object to installing any 
devices requested by the EPA, which is hardly the case. Thus, in the 
regulatory context of the Clean Air Act, it is the enforcement of the 
right to usus fructus, the right to returns from production, which is 
the focus of the property rights enforcement model. 39 The following 
sections develop and apply the model to the Clean Air Act regula-
tions. 
B. The Resource Cost Curve 
The resource cost curve measures the total dollar investment in 
pollution reduction by emitters required by the regulations for 
various numbers of emitters in an air quality control region (AQCR), 
given a fixed level of air quality to which each breather is entitled. 
The dollar investment in pollution reduction is a measure of the 
number of units of the good supplied. Turning low quality (dirty) air 
into higher quality (clean) air is a production process which supplies 
units of the good "pollution reduction." The resource cost curve 
represents the functional relationship between the number of emit-
ters in an AQCR and the number of pollution reduction units to be 
produced. The shape of the resource cost curve for any AQCR will 
37. See Barnes, B'U/Pro note 6 (discussing the EPA's enforcement strategy). 
38. See 42 U.S.C. SS 7409, 7411, 7412; 40 C.F.R. Parts 50-99 (1980). 
39. See injm text and note at note 87. 
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..depend on the types of emitters subject to EPA control in the area, 
the restrictions placed on the emitters, and the air quality in the 
regIon. 
Under the provisions of the Clean Air Act as amended in 1977, the 
level of air quality dictates the rules constraining emitters.40 Clean 
air regions are those which have an air quality exceeding that 
specified by the national primary and secondary air quality stand-
ards, the national standards for hazardous air pollutants, and rele-
vant state and local modifications of these standards. Such regions 
are also subject to rules for the prevention of significant deteriora-
tion of air quality, the PSD rules,41 which specify maximum 
allowable increases in the concentration of controlled pollutants over 
a baseline concentration. Dirty air regions are those which do not 
meet these various standards. Under the 1977 Amendments to the 
Clean Air Act, dirty air areas are subject to the nonattainment provi-
sions which are designed to improve air quality in those areas that 
have not attained the national standards for air quality by requiring 
new emitters to demonstrate a net benefit resulting from their pro-
posed use of the air. 42 
Diagramatically, the resource cost curve for each type of area ap-
pears as shown in Figure 10. In each type of area, an initial number 
of emitters, N~, for the clean air area and N~, for the dirty air area is 
assumed. The congestion point in the Clean Air Act context, Nc, is 
reached when so many emitters are releasing pollutants into the air 
in an AQCR that the applicable standards are violated. Thus, the 
clean air area may be defined as one in which N~ (the initial number 
of emitters) is less than Nc; the dirty air area is one in which N~ is 
greater than Nc. The upward sloping nature of both curves in Figure 
10 indicates that emitters must produce some pollution reduction 
even in clean air areas. Once the congestion point is passed, in-
creased efforts by new emitters to produce pollution reduction are 
required and, therefore, the slope increases. On a practical level, it 
has been suggested that costs of removal of pollutants from emis-
sions generally increase sharply as percentage removal required in-
creases.48 This observed relationship can be incorporated into the 
40. Compare 42 U.S.C. Subchapter I, Part C (clean air areas) with 42 U.S.C. Subchapter I, 
Part D (dirty air areas). 
41. See 42 U.S.C. Subchapter I, Part C; id. S 7473 (Increments and Ceilings). 
42. See 42 U.S.C. Subchapter I, Part D; id. S 7502 (Nonattainment Provisions). 
43. See Downing & Watson, supra note 8, at 220. 
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resource cost curve. Using the resource cost curve as a starting 
point, it is possible to examine the implications of changing the direc-
tion and content components of the property rights assignment in 
this specific regulatory context. First, however, the enforcement 
relationship is described in its Clean Air Act application. 
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C. The Enforcement Curve 
In the Clean Air Act context, the enforcement curve relates the 
quantities of resources devoted to protecting or enforcing property 
rights to clean air to the quantities of resources devoted to the pro-
duction of clean air. By hypothesis, the more resources emitters of 
pollution must devote to pollution abatement, the more they will, 
ceteris paribus, resist compliance with emission control regulations. 
In the general property rights model, protecting the right to con-
sume a good that is not a pure public good requires prevention of 
unauthorized simultaneous consumption by others. Under the Clean 
Air Act, all emitters are entitled to consume the air so long as they 
comply with rules requiring abatement. As a result, the enforcement 
task is to force emitters to bear the costs of compliance with those 
rules. For any complete specification of a property rights assign-
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ment, it is possible, in a world of full information with respect to 
firms' compliance responses, to derive a relationship describing the 
number of enforcement units needed to ensure compliance with en-
vironmental regulations. With this starting point, the effect of alter-
ing the direction, inclusiveness, or content of the rights assignment 
on the enforcement relation can be described. Figure 11 presents 
such a point with the vertical axis measuring dollars of pollution 
reduction expenses to be borne by the emitters and the horizontal 
axis indicating the corresponding number of enforcers (perhaps 
inspector-engineer-attorney teams, with their support staffs). 
FIGURE 11 
An Enforcement Relation for the Clean Air Context 
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D. Enforcement Planning and Changes in Regulatory Structure: 
The Impact of Changing Air Quality Standards 
With the basic curves described in Figures 10 and 11, resource cost 
curves for clean air/dirty air areas and an enforcement relation, con-
sider how the property rights model can be used to examine the en-
forcement cost implications of a change in the regulations governing 
resource use. Three sections of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1977 require the review and potential adoption of standards for 
various pollutants.44 Two of these are concerned with emissions of 
nitrous oxides and require an immediate review of present standards 
and the adoption of a new primary standard for N02 concentrations 
measured over a period not greater than three hours.46 The third 
section sets in motion machinery for controlling radioactive 
pollutants.46 The generally desired impact of changing the standards 
or adopting new ones is to change the quality of the air. An improve-
ment in required air quality such as would be mandated by the 
stricter N02 standards is an increase in the level of benefits assigned 
to breathers of the air. This is a change in the content (C) component 
of the property right to clean air. Because a revision of standards im-
plying an increase in air quality means that emitters must bear addi-
tional costs in order to comply with new regulations and standards, 
these amendments represent a change in the direction of the assign-
ment as well. Recall that the direction component of the property 
right assignment indicates which types of emitters are entitled to use 
the air.47 In this light, the amendment respecifies characteristics of 
proper use of the air, implicitly specifying who may and may not use 
the air in an AQCR. 
The cumulative effect of altering the context and direction com-
ponents of the rights depends on whether it would be more or less 
costly to comply with the regulations before or after the new regula-
tion is adopted. In the case of the N02 standard, the impetus for 
change from the previous annual arithmetic mean standard was the 
scientific advance recognizing that short-term exposure to N02 can 
be hazardous to health. The National Academy of Sciences concluded 
shortly before the 1977 Amendments were passed that the air quali-
44. P.L. 95·95 SS 104(b), 106(b), 406(d) (1977), codified at 42 U.S.C. SS 7408(c), 7409(c), 
7422(a) (Supp. II 1978 & Supp. IV 1980). 
45. 42 U.S.C. SS 7408(c), 7409(c). 
46. 42 U.S.C. S 7422(a). 
47. See supra text following note 22; supra text and notes at notes 36-38. 
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ty standard should consist of a short (hourly) standard and a long 
(yearly) exposure limit.48 It is quite likely that this new short ex-
posure limit will make it more expensive for stationary sources such 
as nitric acid plants or stationary gas turbines to comply with the 
regulations. The increase in total cost of compliance to existing and 
entering emitters is reflected in the upward shift of the resource cost 
curve from RCo to the curve RCl in Quadrant I of Figure 12. 
A shift in the enforcement relation may also occur as a result of 
this amendment. Recall that a shift in the enforcement curve results 
from a change in the marginal productivity of enforcement units in 
ensuring compliance with regulations. 49 Because the costs of 
monitoring and testing emission levels vary for different types of 
pollutants, the enforcement planner must recognize that, for one 
pollutant compared to another, an enforcement team might have to 
work longer to prevent violations of regulations. Similarly, the ex-
pense in terms of enforcement teams may be higher or lower for long 
(yearly) standards than for short (hourly) standards. Extending en-
forcement to a new type of emitter is a change in direction of the 
property rights assignment, since the regulations in effect apply to 
new types of economic agents entitled to consume the air. 60 The 
direction change requires a reevaluation of the enforcement effort· 
per dollar of required pollution reduction expense to be borne by the 
new category of polluter. 
The impact of a change in direction may be more easily seen in the 
context of the new standards for radioactive pollutants. For these 
standards, enforcers either may have to take greater precautions to 
avoid contamination in the process of detecting violations, or, for 
those enforcers not operating in the field, may have to work with 
particularly complex models of dispersion and interactive effects of 
radioactive emissions from a given source. The combined effect on 
the enforcement curve of changes in the direction and content com-
ponents of the respecified property rights is reflected in the shift 
from EUIlf to EUM in Quadrant II of Figure 12. 
A change in the inclusiveness of the assignment may also result 
from changing standards for emissions of particular pollutants. The 
adoption of an hourly standard for emission of N02 may mean that 
48. H. REp. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 40, reprinted in 2 U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 
1118 (1977). 
49. See B'Upra at Figure 3. 
50. See B'Upra text following note 25. 
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more emitters will come under the scrutiny of the EPA. This would 
be a change in the inclusiveness of the property rights assignment, 
since the rights would be assigned to a different number of emitters. 
If the marginal productivity of enforcement units is higher when 
there are fewer firms required to engage in a given dollar amount of 
pollution reduction, then this change in the inclusiveness of the 
assignment would shift the enforcement relation as hypothesized in 
the shift of the enforcement curve from EU3r to EU& in Quadrant II 
of Figure 12. 
Adoption of new standards need not involve a change in the 
technology of enforcement, that is, the enforcement tools available 
to the enforcing agency. An example of the type of amendment to 
the Clean Air Act that might shift the enforcement curve because of 
a change in the sanction component is the adoption of a new 
economic penalty for noncompliance. Section 120 of the Act as 
amended in 197761 provides for the collection of a penalty equal to 
the economic value to the firm of the delay in compliance, thus 
eliminating, in theory if not in practice, any gain from non-
compliance. A strict penalty such as this adds a more powerful 
weapon to the enforcement teams' arsenal without much increase in 
cost. Even the estimation of the amount· of cost savings by the 
violating firm is made at the violator's expense. If this leads to in-
creased compliance by emitters, then the marginal productivity of 
enforcement units will have increased, as indicated by the shift of the 
enforcement relation from EU& to EUHr in Quadrant II of Figure 12. 
The enforcement planning curve traced out in Quadrant IV of 
Figure 12 to reflect the impact of these shifts demonstrates the in-
crease in enforcement costs associated with the 1977 Amendments. 
For instance, for a population of emitters of size Nl at the time of the 
1977 Amendments, the planners take into account an increase in en-
forcement costs from ECo to ECI as the enforcement planning curve 
shifts from Epa to EPI. This shift in the enforcement planning curve 
represents the increase in the total cost of regulation enforcement of 
a given number of emitters under the amendments. Note that the 
cost of hiring each enforcement input team does not necessarily 
change when the Clean Air Act is amended; the curve shift from Epo 
to EPI occurs independently of such factors. The cost of hiring at-
51. 42 u.s.c. § 7420. 
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torneys, engineers, and their support staffs is determined by market 
forces outside of the regulator's control. Thus, the enforcement in-
put cost curve in Quadrant III of Figure 13 does not shift. 
Congress already requires that the Administrator of the EPA, in 
cooperation with state, interstate, and local air pollution control 
agencies, prepare the data needed to make these projections and 
submit detailed estimates and cost studies to Congress annually. 52 In 
particular, the Clean Air Act specifies the preparation of estimates 
for the cost of carrying out the provisions of the Act and a study of 
the costs of program implementation by affected units of govern-
ment.53 The estimates of pollution reduction costs provide basic data 
for the relevant portions of the resource cost curve in Quadrant 1. 
The enforcement costs depicted in Quadrants II and III necessarily 
form part of the mandated study of program implementation ex-
pense.54 Ultimately, changes in these areas can be reflected in the 
enforcement planning curve in Quadrant IV of Figure 12. 
E. Some Impacts of Proposed Clean Air Act Amendments 
Just as the effect of past amendments can be estimated, the en-
forcement cost implications of proposed amendments can be 
predicted. The property rights model can be used to highlight 
reasons for changes in the level of enforcement costs. In large part, 
H.R. 5252,55 rather than amending the existing environmental prop-
erty rights, amends the way in which rights are established. H.R. 
5252 is directed towards the relationship between federal and state 
agencies in reviewing implementation plans,56 the role of the states 
in issuing permits,57 and the power of agencies to grant extensions 
of time limits for states to reach pollution reduction goals. 58 None of 
these concerns is explicitly designed to modify the air quality to 
52. Id. S 7612(a). 
53.Id. 
54. Existing studies on EPA programs as a whole focus more on the expenditures by emit-
ters than on the enforcement cost implications of the strategic interactions between enforcers 
and emitters. See, e.g., U.S. EPA LEGAL COMPILATION, VOL. V, GUIDELINES AND REPORTS 2399 
(Reports to Congress as required by 42 U.S.C. S 7612); COUNCIL ON ENVT'L QUALITY, EN· 
VIRONMENTAL QUALITY VOLS. 1-12 (Reports transmitted to Congress from the President as re-
quired by S 201 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. S 4341 (1969 & 
Supp. 1980). But see Downing & Watson, supra note 8, at 230-33 (where this strategic interac-
tion is explored). 
55. H.R. 5252, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 
56. H.R. 5252, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. S 102 (1981). 
57.Id. 
58. Id. S 105. 
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which breathers are entitled nor is any likely to have direct effects on 
the level of enforcement costs, even though there may be indirect ef-
fects on that level. Thus, the applicability of the basic property rights 
model used to describe the Clean Air Act regulatory efforts would 
remain largely unchanged. 
The effect on air quality of other changes in rights arising from 
many of the proposed amendments is not obvious, but even more 
obscure are the enforcement cost implications of the proposals. Two 
such changes appear in § 107 of H.R. 5252.59 They are: (1) an amend-
ment permitting five occasions per year during which the maximum 
allowable increases over baseline concentrations prescribed under 
the rules for prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) may be ex-
ceeded,60 instead of one occasion as now allowed under § 163(a) of 
the Clean Air Act;61 and (2) a redefinition of what constitutes "best 
available control technology" (BACT) for the purposes of applying 
PSD and nonattainment rules.62 The property rights model can be 
used to evaluate the associated enforcement cost implications of 
these proposed changes. 
1. Exceeding the Maximum Allowable Increases Under the 
PSD Rules 
The rules for prevention of significant deterioration (PSD rules) 
limit the amount of the decrease in air quality in every clean air 
region. The procedure under the PSD rules is to specify, in terms of 
concentrations of various pollutants, an air quality which serves as a 
reference point. Emissions may increase concentrations of these 
pollutants, but only by a limited amount, called the "maximum 
allowable increase" in concentration, over existing concentration 
levels.6a State implementation plans were required under the 1977 
Clean Air Act Amendments to ensure that actual concentrations ex-
ceeded this maximum allowable increase no more than once per 
year.64 H.R. 5252 permits the maximum to be exceeded five times 
per year, which results in a lower resultant average air quality 
relative to the current law. Nevertheless, it results in a higher 
59. Id. S 107. 
60. Id. S 107(a)(2) (1981). 
61. 42 U.S.C. S 7473(a). 
62. H.R. 5252, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. S 107(d) (1981). 
63. 42 U.S.C. S 7473(a). 
64. Id. 
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resulting average level of quality than occurred under the original 
Clean Air Act, under which the air was allowed to deteriorate to a 
level of quality specified in the national standards. 66 
Property rights analysis of this change under H.R. 5252 follows 
the same general lines as the analysis of changing air quality stand-
ards done previously, except that where the standard for oxides of 
nitrogen examined above becomes stiffer, this requirement is more 
lax. Accordingly, the benefits per breather, the level of air quality, 
declines through this change in the content component of the proper-
ty right. While the change in investment in pollution reduction may 
be very slight and few emitters will save a great deal of money 
(issues to be examined by the policymaker or enforcement planner), 
a slight change in the requirements for being an emitter in a par-
ticular AQCR creates a change in the direction of the assignment as 
well as a change in content. The main changes in the property rights 
assignment, then, are in direction and content. The result is that the 
resource cost curve shifts down slightly from RCo to RCI, as shown 
in Quadrant I of Figure 13, indicating that compliance with the pro-
posed regulations by emitters is less costly. This shift would have a 
corresponding effect on the enforcement planning curve in Quadrant 
IV, a shift downward from Epo to EPI, indicating that enforcement 
would be less costly if this amendment were adopted. It is unlikely 
that this change would have a noticeable impact on the efficiency of 
enforcement units in preventing violations; thus, the only direct im-
pact on the planning curve comes from the change in compliance 
cost. 
2. Redefining "Best Available Control Technology" (BACT) 
As part of the PSD rules, the 1977 Amendments instituted 
preconstruction review requirements mandating that no major emit-
ting facility be constructed in any area covered by the PSD rules 
unless the proposed facility is subject to the best available control 
technology for each pollutant regulated by the Clean Air Act.66 
65. Thus, air in a clean air area with a baseline twenty·four hour sulfur dioxide concentra-
tion of 100 micrograms-per-cubic-meter (ug/mS) would be allowed to deteriorate in quality to 
365 ug/mS, the national primary air quality standard, 40 C.F.R. S 50.4, before the PSD rules, 
42 U.S.C. Subchapter I, Part C, were adopted in 1977 but only to 105 ug/mS under the PSD 
rules, 42 U.S.C. S 7473(b)(1). A one-time per year exceedence of this 105 ug/mS standard is per-
mitted under the present Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. S 7473(a), but the amendment would allow 
this maximum allowable increase to be exceeded five times per year. H.R. 5252, 97th Cong., 
1st Sess. S 107(a)(2) (1981). 
66. 42 U.S.C. S 7475(a)(4). 
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Under those Amendments the "best available control technology" 
was "an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduc-
tion of each pollutant . . . which the permitting authority, on a case-
by-case basis, ... determines is achievable for such facility"67 taking 
a variety of costs into account.68 By contrast, H.R. 5252 redefines 
"best available control technology" as the applicable standard of per-
formance established under section 111 of the Clean Air Act, which 
sets forth general standards of performance for new sources 
(NSPS)69 and section 112, which establishes national emission stand-
ards for hazardous air pollutants70 under the Act. 71 Under those sec-
tions, standards of performance are determined for categories of 
sources so that the best system of continuous emission reduction is 
not determined for each source individually but for all sources of that 
type as a group. 72 
67. Id. S 7479(3) (emphasis added). 
68.Id. 
69. 42 U.S.C. S 7411. 
70. Id. S 7412. 
71. H.R. 5252, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. S 107(d) (1981). 
72. 42 U.S.C. S 7411 (1976 & Supp. Pamph. 1981). 
[Sec. 7411] (a) for the purposes of this section: (1) The term 'standard of performance' 
means - (A) with respect to any pollutant emitted from a category of fossil fuel fired 
stationary sources. . . . a standard -
(i) establishing allowable emission limitations for such category of sources, and 
(ii) requiring the achievement of a percentage reduction in the emissions from such 
category of sources ... 
(B) with respect to any pollutant emitted from a [second] category of stationary 
sources .... , a standard such as that referred to in subparagraph (A)(i); and 
(C) with respect to any air pollutant emitted from a [third category of sources], a 
standard which reflects the degree of emission reduction achievable through the ap-
plication of the best system of continuous emission reduction which '" the Ad-
ministration determines has been adequately demonstrated for that category of 
sources. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
H.R. 5252 amends S 111 but not in any way relevant to this discussion. 
Under S 112 the Administrator establishes general standards for hazardous air pollutants 
which, without a waiver, no emitting source may violate and for which no source specific work 
practices may be adopted. 
In Northern Plains Resource Council v. EPA, 645 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Cir-
cuit relied on this case-by-case determination to permit two coal-fired electric power plants to 
use a scrubber technology to reduce emissions instead of the more sophisticated baghouse con-
trol system. As the court stated: 
The EPA is [sic] promulgating an NSPS [new source performance standard under 
Section III] is also obligated to take into account the 'costs of achieving such emission 
reduction and any nonair quality health and environmental impact and energy re-
quirements.' Section lll(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a). That examination, 
however, can only be a generalized consideration of the technology and its effects on 
those factors based on data from many varied sources. Under the PSD program, the 
BACT determination is supposed to be source-specific. What may be applicable to 
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Given that the section 111 review is general and represents data 
for a variety of plants of a given type, there are likely to be some sta-
tionary sources that would do better than average and others whose 
appropriate level of control would be lower than average, consider-
ing cost and meteorological factors. The effect of this change from a 
case-by-case approach to a category-based standard would depend 
on whether the EPA has used the case-by-case approach more to stif-
fen requirements or has used it more to relax them. 
It is clear that in practice emitters have relied on the provisions in 
section 169(3)78 to obtain exemption from the stiffer general require-
ments of section 111.74 In Northern Plains Resource Council v. 
EPA, (Northern Plains)16 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that the EPA had a rational basis for permitting an emitter to adopt 
a wet scrubber technology rather than a more sophisticated bag-
house control system to reduce particulate emissions from a coal-fit-
ted electric utility plant. The wet scrubber technology was held to be 
BACT even though it permitted "a particulate matter emission rate 
in excess of the 1978 NSPS regulations and ... [was] surpassed by 
known baghouse technology."76 According to the court, employing 
more sophisticated technologies in conjunction with the wet scrubber 
would have involved "a great deal of additional expense for a very 
small increase in particulate removal."77 Assuming that the applica-
tion of section 169(3) in this case is typical, the enforcement cost im-
plications of the H.R. 5252 amendment of this section can be ex-
~~. -
To the extent that case-by-case review of BACT under section 
169(3) permits the relaxation of pollution reduction standards, H.R. 
5252 precludes such relaxation by proposing category-based BACT 
standards tied directly to established control levels in the Act. 
Following the Northern Plains example, repealing section 169(3) 
would result in a small change in the content component of the prop-
erty rights and a major change in the direction component. Under 
the case-by-case review of BACT in Northern Plains, air quality 
most plants may not be appropriate for a particular facility. The EPA under its 
regulations is obligated to assure that an individualized inquiry is made on the matter. 
645 F.2d at 1359, n.29. 
73. 42 U.S.C. S 7479(3). 
74. 42 U.S.C. S 7411. 
75. 645 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1981). 
76. 645 F.2d at 1360. The 1971 NSPS regulations were determined to be the applicable ones 
and the facility did meet that lower standard, 0.10 lbs. per million BTU in 1971, as opposed to 
0.03 lbs. per million BTU in the 1978 NSPS regulations. 
77. Id. at 1361. 
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would decrease somewhat as a result of the use of the wet scrubber 
technology over more advanced technology. Eliminating this less so-
phisticated technology as an alternative, as section 107(d) of H.R. 
5252 seems to require, would yield higher air quality, though the in-
crease might be very small. The level of benefits to breathers of air, 
the air quality, is still embodied in the content component of the 
property rights assignment. The direction component indicates what 
types of emitters may operate in the AQCR. The H.R. 5252 amend-
ment indicates that only those operators complying with the section 
111 BACT definition will be allowed to construct new plants. As a 
result of the changes in direction and content, the resource cost 
curve shifts from RCo to RCl in Quadrant I of Figure 14. The shift in 
the resource cost curve from RCo to RCI in Figure 14 illustrates the 
Ninth Circuit's observation that this increase in air quality comes on-
ly at "a great deal of additional expense."78 This effect on the 
resource cost curve accounts for the shift in the enforcement plan-
ning curve from Epo to EpI in Quadrant IV of Figure 14.79 
The mere requirement of more expenditure by emitters on pollu-
tion reduction without any corresponding change in the efficiency of 
enforcement teams would imply a movement along the EUIff curve 
from euO to eul as the content of the right to produce (and pay for) re-
duced emissions changes, reflecting increased expenditure. The en-
forcement planning curve would not be affected. The adoption of one 
technology for control rather than another, which the H.R. 5252 
amendment requires, may, however, have an effect on the efficiency 
of enforcers of the rights to clean air. If enforcement teams spend 
less time ensuring that each dollar of pollution reduction expense is 
borne by the emitters as a result of this amendment, then the en-
forcement curve will shift up and to the left, as from EUIff to EU~ in 
Quadrant II of Figure 14. To determine the likelihood of such an in-
78. [d. 
79. In the environmental context, any increase in emitters' expenditure that affects air 
quality always affects both the direction and content components of the right. Yet, these com-
ponents are not inseparable. An increase in expenditures that does not affect air quality, as an 
emitter opposing a regulation might allege, would affect only the direction of the assignment. 
For the purely private good, the lollipop, we would have a change in content which would shift 
the resource cost curve even without a change in direction, if each of the ten individuals al-
lowed five minutes of lollipop-licking time had their allotments increased to ten minutes, 
thereby requiring additional units of the good, lollipop. The same is true with some congestible 
goods such as the candle; longer availability of candlelight to each entitled person would re-
quire production of additional units of the good, candle. It is because the emitters both 
diminish air quality (as users) and increase air quality (as producers of pollution reduction) that 
the simultaneous changes in direction and content appear in the Clean Air Act context. 
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crease in efficiency, the direction component of this rights assign-
ment must be examined, since those operators affected must now 
use a new technology. 
An immediate effect on enforcement would coincide with the 
switch from the case-by-case analysis to determine the best technol-
ogy for each new stationary source to the ascertainment that a new 
source is installing the best available control technology for that 
category of sources as predetermined by sections 110 and 112 of the 
Act. In that case each enforcement team would require less time to 
evaluate whether qualifications for permits are met. Whether, in 
general, this would be a large or small portion of preconstruction 
review effort is difficult to say a priori, but the direction of such an 
effect would be reflected in the shift from EU& to EUIu in Figure 14. 
This shift, combined with the changing resource cost curve, would 
yield a new enforcement planning curve, Ep2 in Quadrant IV of 
Figure 14. This curve represents the enforcement planning curve 
under H.R. 5252 by accounting for the expected efficiency of en-
forcement under the category-based approach to BACT. 
Once a given standard and technology are applied and in place, 
there will likely not be any great change in enforcement as regards 
the detection of violations. The scrubber technology, in which par-
ticles are separated from emissions by first dampening the emissions 
with a spray of water and then settling the particles out of the water 
by the use of settling ponds, is quite different from thebaghouse 
system, which removes particulates from emissions by passing the 
exhaust gas through fIlters in an enclosed area.80 In either case, 
however, the detection of a violation of performance standards 
depends on the quantity of particulates still present in the emissions 
after passing through the different devices. Federal regulations 
specify one method for determining particulate concentration that 
does not appear to depend on removal technology. 81 This suggests 
that the detection portion of the enforcement process would be no 
different after the H.R. 5252 amendment. Enforcers would be equal-
ly efficient in detecting operating violations of the standard, and so 
compliance inspection efforts should not change. 
In some cases, however, the EPA might require that the emitter 
adopt "a design, equipment, work practice, operational standard, or 
combination thereof" instead of a uniformly applicable emission 
so. See Nat'l Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 424-26 (D.C Cir. 1980) (comparing these 
techniques). 
81. 8.40 C.F.R. Part 60 App., Method 6 (1982). 
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standard as discussed in the above situation.82 Inspections to deter-
mine compliance with such specification standards as work practices 
are likely to be quite a different process from inspections of emis-
sions to establish compliance with a predetermined level of par-
ticulate emission. Although the same type of enforcement team 
(engineer-lawyer with support staff) is involved, work practice com-
pliance inspection will entail greater inspection efforts. The relative 
efficiency of enforcement units in ensuring compliance under the dif-
ferent approaches would be reflected in the enforcement curve. An 
amendment eliminating a work practice or operational standard 
which is difficult to enforce as an option would shift the enforcement 
curve up and to the left as from EU8i to EUM in Quadrant II of Figure 
14, with a corresponding effect in the enforcement planning curve. 
Application of the PSD rules BACT definition would not always 
result in relaxed standards for new sources,88 even though Northern 
Plains indicates that such a result can occur. 84 Section 7479(3) of the 
Clean Air Act requires that "[i]n no event shall application of 'best 
available control technology' result in emissions of any pollutants 
which will exceed the emissions allowed by an applicable standard 
established pursuant to section 7411 or 7412,"85 implying that, 
whenever possible, the BACT controls will be more stringent.86 The 
higher cost associated with meeting a more stringent standard 
would be reflected both in a change in the content and direction of 
the right to emit pollutants and in a shift of the resource cost curve in 
the opposite direction of that suggested by the Northern Plains 
analysis, resulting in greater pollution reduction cost and greater en-
forcement cost. (Compare RCl with RCo; EU8i with EUM in Figure 
14.) 
F. The Optimal Level of Enforcement of Clean Air Act Provisions 
Recall that in contemplating the resource cost curve, the discus-
sion focused on the right to usus, or the right to consume the re-
source in question and thereby decrease its available quantity. In the 
Clean Air Act context, only the enforcement of the right to usus 
fructus, the right to obtain the returns due from productive activity, 
82. 40 C.F.R. S 52.21(b)(12) (1982). 
83. Quarles, Federal Regulation of New Industrial Plants, 10 ENVT'L REp. (BNA) 
Monograph No. 28 (May 4, 1979). 
84. 645 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1981). 
85. 42 U.S.C. S 7479(3) (Supp. III 1979). 
86. See Quarles, 1l'Upra. note 83, at 8-13. 
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need be described. This is true in the context of controlling externali-
ties such as pollution because ensuring that the emitters appropriate 
the returns from the reduction in air pollution also ensures that 
breathers benefit from clean air. The strange nature of the right to 
ususfructus in this regulatory context is, however, that the returns 
to productive activity are negative. The emitters must produce the 
good, pollution reduction, and bear the costs of doing so. The returns 
appropriated in this context, then, are negative. It is because returns 
are negative, that is, because emitters must bear the costs of pollu-
tion reduction, that they must be forced to produce. Once this pro-
duction takes place, however, breathers, who do not then interfere 
with each other's simultaneous consumption, cannot be excluded 
from reaping the consumption benefits from clean air. 
In the context of usus fructus, the content component of the right 
indicates the benefits to which polluters are entitled, or, in other 
words, the returns to their productive activity. There are likely to be 
two sources of negative returns to the emitters; the costs of pollution 
reduction itself, and the costs associated with the enforcement proc-
ess. The degree of protection of the breathers' right to clean air 
chosen by the enforcers will depend, among other things, on emit-
ters' responses to regulatory requirements. 
Current models of emitters' incentives to comply focus on the pro-
ducers' desire to minimize the sum of expected costs of control 
devices and the expected costs of compliance and enforcement ac-
tions imposed on the firm.87 The cost of control devices includes all of 
the components measured on the vertical axis of the resource costs 
curve - capital and installation costs as well as operation, main-
tenance, monitoring, and certification costs. The expected com-
pliance cost is a function of the number of violations detected by the 
enforcers times the anticipated penalty per violation. Because the 
producing firm has a choice of bearing either the cost of compliance 
or the cost of penalties, the content component of the right to usus 
fructus will be affected by regulations altering either cost.. The 
precise impact of the content component on the enforcement curve 
can only be determined by reference to models of behavior for the 
firm and for the enforcer. 
The solution to the question of what is the optimal response by an 
87. See Downing & Watson, supra note 8, at 228-33. 
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enforcement agency to a producing firm's behavior requires a model 
of the interaction of the decisionmaking of two economic agents, 
which is outside the scope of this article.88 It can be said, however, 
that for a given set of property rights and behavior by the enforcers, 
the fIrm can adapt its behavior to minimize costs. The enforcement 
agency, for a given set of property rights and behavior by the firm, 
also can minimize its cost, which equals the sum of enforcement ex-
penditures and the harm resulting from violations. Generally, the 
determination of the optimal level of enforcement follows the net 
gain maximization model discussed above in section III.B. The ra-
tional enforcer would invest in additional units of enforcement (in 
the H.R. 5252 example, by reducing the number of allowable ex-
ceedence occasions in AQCRs or by making standards more 
stringent according to the definition of BACT) until the incremental 
cost of increased enforcement equals the value of the harm 
prevented. As in the general model, the marginal conditions for max-
imizing the net gain function would be satisfied at some point coin-
ciding with less than full enforcement, and some violations would be 
expected. Similarly, for a given set of regulations defining the right 
to usus fructus producing firms would maximize the net benefit of 
the property rights assignment by minimizing their costs (cost of 
control devices and cost of compliance versus cost of penalties). It is 
the interaction of the behavior of enforcement agencies and produc-
ing firms which ultimately determines the optimal level of enforce-
ment of property rights in the Clean Air Act context. 
As the content component of the right to usus fructus changes, the 
optimal enforcement and noncompliance positions of control agen-
cies and producing fIrms change. The precise interaction of changes 
in the relationships affecting decisionmaking is unknown. As in the 
general optimal enforcement model, this shift could depend on any 
number of factors affecting incentives to violate or comply with 
regulations, such as increased penalties; or incentives to enforce 
regulations, such as the newfound awareness of health benefits or 
even political benefits to be derived from strict enforcement. All of 
these variables can be reflected in a change in the enforcement plan-
ning curve. 89 
88. But see, for instance, the attempts by Gary Becker, supra note 9, to model this process. 
It may be necessary to resort to the variety of models of duopoly behavior to predict the out-
come of this interactive process. If so, the industrial organization and pricing literature will be 
a relevant input to the environmental policymakers' decision process. 
89. See supra discussion at section III. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The model presents a tool for breaking down institutional struc-
tures into parts small enough to enable fruitful examination. Rights 
assigned to various types of economic agents have been separately 
considered. The rights to usus and usus fructus are defined in such a 
way as to make them useful in analyzing various changes in institu-
tions. The definitions distinguish between individuals on the basis of 
the nature of their relationships to· property rather than by other 
traditional economic categories such as rich versus poor or utility 
maximizers versus profit maximizers. As such, it fits squarely within 
the standard set for property rights theory by Furubotn and 
Pejovich.90 The model describes how the content of property rights 
affects the allocation and use of resources in specific and predictable 
ways by elaborating on one side of the cost-benefit analysis which 
determines how property is to be used and how public policy relating 
to resource use can rationally be formulated. It uses the logic of 
economics to explain the development of property rights, including 
the nature of changes in their content. To provide this explanation, 
the model focuses attention on how institutional structures embody-
ing property rights assignments may be viewed as responding to the 
problem of minimizing the cost of ensuring compliance with those 
property rights. By empirically estimating the relationships de-
scribed here, administrators and policymakers can more rationally 
assess alternative structures for achieving various policy goals. 
Various systems can be compared according to the benefits likely to 
accrue from each and the costs of enforcement of each. 
A comparative statics model has been developed to describe how 
the level of costs of enforcing environmental regulations would re-
spond to various amendments to the Clean Air Act. By viewing 
amendments as changes in property rights, the model has focused at-
tention on how the institutional arrangements created by the Clean 
Air Act regulate the interaction between economic agents with 
respect to the resource in question - pollution reduction, or clean 
air. The interactions take place in two general contexts of relevance 
to the level of enforcement costs. The first is the relationship be-
tween supply of the good, pollution reduction, and consumption of 
the good. This relationship is described by the resource cost curve, 
which reflects consumption characteristics of the good by functional-
ly relating the number of emitters in an AQCR to the number of 
90. Furubotn, BUpra note 1, at 1137. 
------------ _ .. 
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units of the good, here measured in dollars of pollution reduction, re-
quired to provide a given level of benefits to each breather. Second, 
the enforcement curve describes the interactions between suppliers 
(producers) and the agents responsible for enforcement. This curve 
reflects the resource commitment necessary to ensure compliance 
with the rights assigned with respect to usus fructus, here the per-
verse right to bear costs of pollution reduction. An attempt has been 
made to capture the relevant influences of this institutional structure 
on the interactions of enforcers and producers in the components of 
the related property rights: direction, inclusiveness, content, and 
sanctions. 
This multidimensional approach to property rights theory can be 
contrasted with previous contributions to the property rights litera-
ture which focused in large part on the public versus private nature 
of ownership of resources. In the environmental area, for instance, 
so-called property rights solutions to environmental problems in-
volve converting common property resources such as air and water 
into privately owned resources by means of schemes permitting a 
market for exchangeable pollution rights. The focus here is not only 
on form of ownership, which is captured in permissible simultaneity 
of consumption, that is, in inclusiveness, but also on other policy 
variables such as the characteristics of permitted use, and the 
characteristics of how rules governing type and simultaneity are to 
be enforced to ensure that the benefits accrue to the designated par-
ties. 
This approach to public goods theory can be contrasted with tradi-
tional public goods theory. Characteristics of jointness and nonex-
cludability have traditionally been associated with goods. This article 
emphasizes that both characteristics are affected not only by inher-
ent characteristics of the good but also by the legal milieu in which 
these goods are consumed and produced. For instance, the jointness 
property· associated with a good will be determined not only by how 
many users can simultaneously consume a given number of units for 
the good without decreasing the benefits received by others but also 
by what types of users are legally permitted to consume. The nonex-
cludability characteristic of a good is here interpreted as more than 
the technical inability to prevent people from reaping the benefits of 
another's productive activities, which is the traditional view. It also 
includes the legal inability of the appropriate economic agent to ac-
quire payment for the productive services. In the model developed 
here an institutional or legal notion of jointness and nonexcludability 
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is combined with traditional economic notions and with a theory of 
the characteristics of property rights. 
Combining these assorted tools of economic theory allows the 
policymaker to sort out the factors influencing the cost of enforcing 
property rights protected by regulatory agencies. The model, prop-
erly applied, reflects the actual structure of regulatory policies and 
incorporates the interaction between enforcers and violators of 
rights. The conceptual foundation is broad enough and the model is 
flexible enough to apply to the enforcement of rights to private 
goods as well as to the congestible public good analyzed in this arti-
cle, thereby introducing a basic theory for anthropological, so-
ciological, and economic studies of the enforcement of property 
rights. 
